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CONGRESS AS INDIAN-GIVER: "PHASING-OUT" TAX 
ALLOWANCES UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 
OF 1986 
Glenn E. Coven* 
The myriad of constraints, both fiscal and political, under which 
the legislation resulting in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was 
drafted produced a series of compromises that frequently offend, 
rather than implement, sound income tax policy. This brief paper 
addresses just one: the rate structure of the new Code. 
At the income level at which a tax is first imposed, the effective 
marginal tax rate is a surprising 25 percent-and can be higher. 
That tax rate is imposed until adjusted gross income reaches 
$17,000 on a joint return, the equivalent of a taxable income some-
where between zero and $9,000. At that point, the marginal rate 
declines-but rarely as low as the nominal15 percent. When taxa-
ble income reaches about $30,000, the marginal rate leaps to 28 
percent where it remains until taxable income reaches about 
$70,000. At that level of income a taxpayer encounters the final 
generally applicable tax bracket of 33 percent, but only upon a 
range of income that varies as a function of the number of children 
the taxpayer has. The more children (or others) that the taxpayer 
claims as dependents, the more of his income is taxed at this maxi-
mum rate. After the appropriate amount of income has been sub-
ject to the 33 percent rate, typically at a taxable income level be-
tween $170,000 to $200,000, the marginal rate actually declines to 
28 percent. Few taxpayers, however, will actually be subject to the 
nominal rates of tax. At various, and perhaps numerous, levels of 
income, nearly all taxpayers will be subject to surtaxes that in-
crease the marginal rate of tax to over 150 percent of the nominal 
tax rate. Thus, some taxpayers will be subject to an effective mar-
ginal tax rate in excess of 50 percent. The resulting rate schedule 
does not at all resemble the reformed two-bracket. schedule so 
widely advertised but rather a line of graffiti inscribed on a New 
York subway. 
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A. 1963, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 
1966, Columbia University. 
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For the most part, the new effective marginal tax rates are not 
found in a table appearing in section 1 of the Code. Rather, they 
result from the new congressional addiction to disappearing deduc-
tions-tax allowances that are progressively denied to taxpayers as 
their income rises. The 1986 legislation did not initiate the practice 
of "phasing out" tax allowances; at least one such provision was 
contained in the 1954 Code as enacted.1 On the other hand, the 
recent legislation not only greatly expanded the number of al-
lowances that are subject to phase-outs, but it enormously in-
creased the number of taxpayers adversely affected by these provi-
sions and greatly increased the impact of these phase-outs on their 
effective marginal tax rates. The phasing out of tax allowances is 
indeed a characteristic feature of the 1986 Code. 
What is most curious about this new legislative technique is that 
most, if not all, of the affected allowances cannot be phased out. 
The misguided attempt to do so has merely resulted in a series of 
irrationally distributed surtaxes that undermine, both in appear-
ance and reality, the equity of the Code and are inconsistent with 
the fundamental objectives of the 1986 legislation. 
I. THE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF REMOVING TAX 
ALLOWANCES 
A. In General 
In a sense, any time a tax allowance, such as a deduction, is de-
nied to a taxpayer, the general effect of the denial is to increase 
the rate of tax imposed upon a segment of the taxpayer's income. 
If a deduction for the expenditure could be claimed, the tax rate 
imposed upon the income used to make the expenditure would be 
zero-the deduction would have sheltered that income from tax. 
Absent the deduction, understandably enough, the taxpayer be-
comes subject to tax on that income. However, and significantly for 
present purposes, the rate of tax on that income simply increases 
to the taxpayer's nominal marginal tax rate. Thus, elimination of 
the deduction causes a segment of income to become subject to tax 
1 The predecessor of the present child care credit was a deduction contained in § 214 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as enacted. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. 
No. 83-591, § 214, 68A Stat. 1, 70-71, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, § 504(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1565. 
1987] "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances 507 
but produces no other result. 
If the tax allowance is denied because of an attribute peculiar to 
a particular class of taxpayers, the resulting increase in tax liability 
may quite properly be viewed as a tax imposed upon that attri-
bute. The most obvious illustration of that relationship appears in 
the series of disallowances that are imposed upon a taxpayer par-
ticipating in an international boycott. Pursuant to section 999 and 
related sections, a number of tax allowances, such as the foreign 
tax credit, are denied to a taxpayer that has participated in an in-
ternational boycott.2 Those provisions are intended, quite obvi-
ously, as penalties for the proscribed forms of conduct and not as a 
technical adjustment of the foreign tax credit. Should those penal-
ties be imposed, they would constitute an added cost of engaging 
in a boycott and not an added cost of being subject to foreign 
taxation. · 
In a somewhat less dramatic context, if the attribute that occa-
sions the disallowance of a deduction is an increase in the income 
of the taxpayer, the resulting increase in tax liability becomes an 
additional tax imposed upon the receipt of that income. Thus, for 
example, a taxpayer might be denied the ability to claim a deduc-
tion for the full amount of his personal exemptions once his taxa-
ble income exceeds a specified level. In that event, the increase in 
tax liability produced by the loss of the deduction would be an 
additional cost of earning the income that resulted in the loss of 
the deduction. The increase in tax liability would not be attributa-
ble to, nor constitute a reversal of, the permissible deduction for 
the personal exemption. 
Unlike the simple disallowance of a deduction for reasons unre-
lated to income levels, the loss of a tax allowance as a function of 
an increase in income always has at least two consequences for the 
computation of tax liability. First, the loss of the deduction pro-
duces an increase in tax liability upon the segment of income that 
is no longer sheltered from tax by the deduction. Second, the in-
come that was responsible for the loss of the allowance will also be 
• See I.R.C. §§ 999 (determination of participation in international boycott); 908 (reduc-
tion of foreign tax credit for participation in or cooperation with international boycott); 
952(a) (determination of "subpart F income" using international boycott factor); 
995(b)(l)(F) (taxable income of DISC shareholder determined using international boycott 
factor). 
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subject to tax. Thus, the loss, or phase-out, of a tax allowance ef-
fectively results in the imposition of two taxes on the increased 
income that resulted in the disallowance. Since the increased in-
come will itself be subject to tax at the taxpayer's nominal margi-
nal bracket rate, the additional tax liability incurred will unavoid-
ably effect an increase in the taxpayer's effective marginal rate to a 
level in excess of the nominal marginal rate. 
To illustrate in a simplified context, assume that a taxpayer hav-
ing an adjusted gross income of $60,000 is entitled to personal ex-
emptions totalling $4,000 and is subject to a marginal tax rate of 
30 percent. Assume further that any increase in income will result 
in a loss of the ability to deduct personal exemptions by an 
amount equal to the excess of gross income over $60,000. Un.der 
these circumstances, the receipt of one dollar of income will, of 
course, result in an increased tax liability of $0.30. However, that 
receipt will also result in the loss of one dollar of deductions, 
thereby subjecting an additional dollar of gross income to tax. This 
additional tax of $0.30 will produce an overall tax of $0.60 on the 
additional dollar of income and thus an effective marginal tax rate 
of 60 percent. 
While the income that becomes taxable by virtue of the lost de-
duction will be taxed at the taxpayer's nominal marginal bracket 
rate, the effective marginal rate of tax on the increased income will 
not necessarily be doubled. If the increase in income only results in 
the loss of a deduction in an amount that is less than the increase 
in income, the increase in the effective marginal tax rate on the 
increased income will be correspondingly reduced. Thus, in the 
previous example, if an increase in income only resulted in the loss 
of a deduction for the personal exemptions equal to 25 percent of 
the excess of gross income over $60,000, a one dollar increase in 
income would result in the loss of only $0.25 of deductions. The 25 
cents of income that would become subject to tax by virtue of the 
loss of the deduction would be taxed at the nominal effective rate 
of 30 percent. However, the additional tax incurred by virtue of 
the receipt would be only 30 percent of $0.25 or $0.075. The result-
ing tax incurred by virtue of the receipt of a one dollar increase in 
income would thus be $0.375, an amount equal to 125 percent of 
the nominal effective rate. 
In either event, whether the additional tax incurred is $0.30 or 
$0.075, that additional tax is attributable to the receipt of the one 
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dollar increase in income and may only be regarded as a further 
tax imposed upon that income. Thus, the result of disallowing a 
tax allowance as a function of increasing income is to increase the 
effective marginal rate of tax upon that income to a level in excess 
of the nominal marginal rate. In practical effect, the disallowance 
enhances the progressivity of the rate structure. The rationality of 
that approach to progression, however, is disputed below. 
B. The Impossibility of "Phasing Out" Tax Allowances 
The foregoing example suggests that tax allowances cannot be 
phased out as a function of an increase in income. Rather, the re-
sulting increase in tax liability is attributable to the increased in-
come and simply produces an increase in the effective tax rate im-
posed upon that additional income. The tax does not produce a 
reduction in the otherwise allowable deduction. That point is no-
\ where better illustrated than in the context of the purported 
phase-out of the 15 percent bracket. 
In order to produce a bill that was revenue neutral by income 
classification3 but which did not appear to impose a rate of tax in 
excess of 28 percent, the Conference Committee determined that 
taxpayers in the very highest income ranges should be subject not 
just to a marginal tax rate of 28 percent, but to an average tax rate 
of 28 percent. • To accomplish that result, it became necessary in 
some manner to eliminate the tax savings produced through the 
normal operation of a progressive rate structure in which the first 
$30,000 of taxable income is subject to a tax rate of only 15 per-
cent. The drafting technique adopted to accomplish that phase-out 
of the 15 percent bracket was to impose an additional income tax 
liability equal to the difference between the 28 percent maximum 
rate and the 15 percent initial rate on the amount of income that 
was subject to the 15 percent tax rate. This additional tax, how-
ever, will be collected only at the rate of 5 percent of taxable in-
come and only with respect to taxable income in excess of the ap-
• See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., Data on Distribution by In-
come Class of Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986) (nine statistical tables), re-
printed in 33 Tax Notes 73 (Oct. 6, 1986). 
• See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, pt. 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986) [hereinafter Confer-
ence Report]. 
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plicable dollar amount, which on a joint return is $71,900.«1 
At first glance, this 5 percent surcharge would appear a highly 
inappropriate approach to diminishing the tax benefit obtained 
from the 15 percent bracket rate. If Congress had wished to reduce 
the amount of income eligible for the lower rate of tax, it would 
appear more normal for the statute to have provided that as in-
come rose beyond a certain level, say $71,900, the amount of in-
come eligible for the 15 percent rate would be progressively re-
duced. Thus, for example, the statute might have provided that for 
every $13 of adjusted gross income in excess of $71,900, the 
amount of income eligible for the 15 percent bracket would be re-
duced by $5. Thus, once the taxpayer derived taxable income of 
$149,900, no amount of income would be eligible for the 15 percent 
rate and the entire amount of the taxpayer's income would be sub-
ject to tax at the 28 percent rate. Thus the average tax rate of 28 
percent sought by Congress would be achieved. 
A reduction in the amount of income eligible for the 15 percent 
rate, however, would have effectively imposed a marginal tax rate 
in excess of 28 percent. As the taxpayer derived $13 of income in 
excess of the $71,900 level, that income would not only be subject 
to tax at the 28 percent rate but would also precipitate an addi-
tional income tax liability attributable to the $5 reduction in the 
amount eligible for the 15 percent rate. Thus, an additional tax 
liability would be imposed equal to 13 percent, the difference be-
tween the 15 and 28 percent rates, on an additional $5 of income 
resulting in an increased tax liability of $0.65. Accordingly, each 
dollar of the additional $13 earned would result in an additional 
tax liability of $0.05. Since each additional dollar earned by the 
taxpayer thus would result in a tax liability of $0.33, the reduction 
in the amount eligible for the 15 percent bracket would be pre-
cisely the equivalent of imposing a 5 percent surtax on income in 
excess of $71,900. The drafters of the 1986 legislation deserve 
credit for having explicitly adopted the far simpler mechanism of 
simply imposing a 5 percent surcharge instead of employing the 
cumbersome device of reducing the amount eligible for the lower 
• See I.R.C. § l(g)(3). The applicable dollar amount which triggers the surtax is $61,650 
for heads of households, $43,150 for unmarried individuals generally, $35,950 for married 
taxpayers filing separately, and $13,000 for estates and trusts. References to income levels 
discussed in this comment are made with respect to joint filers. 
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bracket rate. 
It is perhaps entirely obvious that, having subjected a range of 
income to a marginal tax rate below 28 percent, Congress could not 
achieve an average tax rate equal to 28 percent without imposing a 
marginal tax rate in excess of the 28 percent rate on some range of 
income. Nevertheless, it is of some value to explore precisely why 
the effect of eliminating a tax allowance is identical to the imposi-
tion of a surtax, for it illustrates the essential flaw in the use of 
phased out allowances. 
Once an allowance has been granted to taxpayers at low levels of 
income, its effect cannot be erased from the taxing system. Con-
gress can, if it concludes that taxpayers at a certain level of income 
would otherwise be undertaxed, impose an additional tax. If Con-
gress deems it rational, it may also limit the amount of income 
that will be subject to the additional tax. Moreover, the range of 
income to be subject to the additional tax may be established at an 
amount that will yield precisely the same tax as the amount of tax 
saved by some other provision of the Code, such as the deduction 
for contributions to individual retirement accounts ("IRAs")8 or 
the 15 percent bracket. However, what Congress achieves through 
such a device is not the reversal of the deduction extended to con-
tributions to an IRA or the benefits of the 15 percent bracket, but 
rather an additional tax liability imposed only with respect to a 
limited range of income. 
While the Conference Report to the 1986 legislation refers to the 
5 percent surtax as phasing out the benefit of the 15 percent 
bracket and applying the 28 percent rate to all of the taxpayer's 
taxable income,' thereby reversing the effect of the previously 
granted allowance, that result cannot be achieved and the 5 per-
cent surtax does not approximate that effect. A taxpayer whose 
income places him within the very broad range over which this tax 
allowance is phased out is not subject to a 28 percent tax on an 
expanding segment of his income. Rather, the effect of this phase-
out is precisely the same as subjecting the taxpayer to a 33 percent 
tax upon a segment of his income and the 15 and 28 percent rates 
upon the balance of his income. The 5 percent surtax does not, and 
cannot, reverse the effect of the 15 percent bracket; it is simply the 
• I.R.C. § 219(a). 
7 See Conference Report, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
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imposition of an additional tax. It necessarily follows that the ra-
tionality of the 5 percent surtax cannot be evaluated in terms of 
the propriety of imposing an average rate of tax of 28 percent, for 
no such tax is imposed. Rather, the provision must be evaluated in 
terms of the rationality of imposing a third marginal rate on in-
comes of between $71,900 and $149,900, and imposing a lower mar-
ginal rate of tax on incomes in excess of that amount. 
In fact, of course, the 5 percent surtax is less rational than de-
scribed, for the phase-out is intended to eliminate not only the 
benefits of the 15 percent bracket but also the benefits of the per-
sonal exemptions claimed by the taxpayer.8 As a result, the more 
children a taxpayer has, the greater the amount of his income that 
will be subject to the surtax. As in the case of the phase-out of the 
15 percent bracket, the additional 5 percent tax measured by the 
number of a taxpayer's personal exemptions does not produce a 
pattern of taxation that is the equivalent of disallowing a deduc-
tion for personal exemptions. Rather, the effect is precisely the 
same as imposing a 5 percent surtax on an amount of income mea-
sured by the number of a taxpayer's children-a perverse result 
even for the 1986 legislation. 
C. Phase-Outs by Any Other Name 
While the phase-out of the benefits of the 15 percent bracket 
and the personal exemptions is quite explicitly accomplished in the 
1986 legislation, all phase-outs are not so clearly identified. Any 
phase-out of a tax allowance that is made a function of increased 
income, however, produces an increase in the effective marginal 
rate of tax on the increased income. That some phase-outs are 
characterized differently under the Code conceals the full extent of 
the increase in effective rates. 
When a taxpayer is barred from deducting an expenditure, ex-
cept to the extent that the expenditure exceeds a given fraction of 
income, a phase-out of the deduction is achieved. Imposing such a 
floor on deductions progressively diminishes the taxpayer's ability 
to deduct the expenditure as his income rises. As a result, until a 
taxpayer's income reaches the point at which no deductions at all 
are allowable with respect to the expenditure, the effective margi-
• I.R.C. § l(g)(2)(B). 
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nal tax rate on income derived by the taxpayer increases by the 
percentage of gross income used to establish the deduction floor. 
For example, prior to the 1986 legislation, taxpayers were not 
entitled to deduct medical expenses except to the extent that they 
exceeded 5 percent of adjusted gross income. 9 A taxpayer incurring 
medical expenses in excess of that floor was therefore entitled to 
some deduction with respect to those expenses. However, an addi-
tional dollar of income would not only be subject to the nominal 
marginal tax rate but would also result in the loss of a deduction 
for the medical expense in the amount of $0.05. Thus, the amount 
of ·tax imposed with respect to the additional dollar of income 
would be precisely the same as the tax imposed at the nominal 
marginal rate on 105 percent of the income actually earned. That 
result, of course, is precisely the same as if the marginal rate of tax 
had been increased by the same percentage. A 20 percent tax on 
$105 of income is precisely the same as a 21 percent tax on $100 of 
income.10 
The 1986 legislation increased the medical expense floor to 7.5 
percent of adjusted gross income11 and retained the similar 10 per-
cent floor on the deduction of net casualty losses.12 Of greater sig-
nificance, however, is the imposition of a new floor equal to 2 per-
cent of adjusted gross income for a broad classification of employee 
business and investment expenses.13 Since many more taxpayers 
will have otherwise deductible employee business and investment 
expenses in excess of this 2 percent floor than will have medical or 
casualty losses in excess of the 7.5 and 10 percent floors, many 
more taxpayers will fall within the phase-out range for these de-
ductions and thus be subject to an increase in their effective rates 
of tax. As a result of these provisions, the effective rate of tax on a 
broad spectrum of taxpayers will be from 2 to 19.5 percent higher 
• Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 213(a). 
•• This equivalence is true, of course, only where the nominal rate of tax is a constant. 
" I.R.C. § 213(a). 
11 I.R.C. § 165(h)(2). 
13 See I.R.C. § 67(a). Section 67 subjects all "miscellaneous itemized deductions" other 
than enumerated exceptions to the new 2% floor. ld. The reach of this new provision is 
extensive. Among the expenses not excepted from the 2% floor are union and professional 
dues, entertainment expenses, employment agency fees, the cost of investment advice, tax 
return preparation fees and possibly allowable hobby losses. See I.R.C. § 67(b). As may be 
observed, nearly all of the affected items are entirely legitimate costs of the production of 
taxable income. 
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than the nominal 15; 28, or 33 percent marginal rates of tax that 
appear to confront taxpayers. 
D. An Arguable Exception 
The foregoing has demonstrated that when Congress attempts to 
phase out a deduction to which the taxpayer would have been enti-
tled at a lower income level, the result is a surtax upon a segment 
of income rather than the disallowance of the prior tax benefit. 
That result is obtained regardless of whether the taxpayer would 
have been entitled to the allowance because all taxpayers at low 
income levels are entitled to the allowance, as in the case of the 
personal exemptions, or because the taxpayer would incur the ex-
pense regardless of the availability of the tax benefit, as is the case 
with most medical and employee business expenses. On the other 
hand, the mere barring of a deduction, such as the repeal of the 
state sales tax deduction, only results in subjecting a segment of 
income to tax at the nominal marginal rates-no ancillary or sur-
tax is created. 
The phase-out of a volitional expense that is largely, if not en-
tirely, tax-induced presents a borderline case. The surtax created 
by the phase-out of a tax allowance is only applicable, of course, to 
taxpayers who would have been entitled to the allowance at a 
lower level of income. Thus, where the phase-out is of a volitional 
expenditure, taxpayers only encounter the surtax if they incurred 
the expense, for which the deduction is being eliminated. If a tax-
payer did not incur the expense, the fact that he is progressively 
unable to deduct that expense as his income rises has no tax conse-
quence at all. 
Between adjusted gross incomes of $40,000 and $50,000, the de-
duction for contributions to IRAs is phased out. 14 Whether that 
phase-out should properly be viewed as increasing the effective 
marginal rate of tax may depend on one's perspective. If one views 
the contribution to an IRA as an expenditure that the taxpayer 
has made, or perhaps would make were the deduction not elimi-
nated, this phase-out is indistinguishable from the other phase-
outs considered above. On the other hand, if one views the tax-
•• I.R.C. § 219(g)(2). The reduction only applies if the taxpayer or his or her spouse is an 
active participant in a qualified retirement plan. However, the definition of "active partici-
pant" contained in § 219(g)(5) of the Code, is very broad and thus includes most taxpayers. 
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payer as making a contribution to an IRA only to the extent that it 
is deductible, the phase-out more nearly resembles the mere repeal 
of a deduction. The fact that the taxpayer could have contributed 
and deducted more at a different level of income becomes irrele-
vant. So viewed, the phase-out does not amount to the reversal of a 
previously granted deduction but rather a prohibition upon the 
claiming of a deduction, which, of course, does not have the effect 
of increasing marginal tax rates. 
The analysis of such phase-outs is further cluttered by the po-
tential for disagreement upon when a deduction is volitional and 
thus a less inappropriate subject for a phase-out. The 1986 legisla-
tion now bars taxpayers from claiming losses from most . passive 
business activities against income from sources other than passive 
businesses. 10 This new limitation upon the claiming of passive 
losses is subject to an important exception. Taxpayers may claim 
up to $25,000 of such losses if they are attributable to a rental real 
estate activity in which the taxpayer materially participates in the 
taxable year.16 That exception, however, is phased out between ad-
justed gross income levels of $100,000 and $150,000.17 Clearly, in-
vesting in a real estate activity that will produce net losses is a 
volitional act and often one that is tax-motivated. However, once a 
taxpayer makes such an investment, he may have little control 
over the extent or timing of the losses generated by the activity. 
From the perspective of such a taxpayer, phasing out a rental ac-
tivity loss is indistinguishable"' from phasing out a personal 
exemption. 
Opinions may well differ upon the proper visualization of the 
phase-out of such volitional and tax-motivated deductions. Plainly, 
the case against the phasing out of such deductions is far weaker 
•• See l.R.C. § 469(a). Under this section, losses attributable to the conduct of a trade or 
business, as distinguished from a mere investment activity, in which the taxpayer does not 
materially participate may not be claimed in excess of the income from similar activities. 
See I.R.C. § 469. The general effect of the rule is to bar the claiming of tax shelter losses 
against either earned income or investment (now called portfolio) income. Just as the phase-
outs considered here have extended a plausible idea to outrageous lengths, the passive loss 
rules have extended the schedular approach to the computation of income found in more 
reasonable form in such provisions as §§ 183 (hobby losses) or 163(d) (investment interest) 
and in less reasonable form in § 465 (the "at risk" rules). 
•• I.R.C. § 469(i). The general rule is that "passive activity" includes "any rental activ-
ity." I.R.C. § 469(c)(2). 
11 I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(A). 
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than is the case against phasing out such allowances as the 15 per-
cent bracket and the personal exemptions. Nevertheless, as de-
scribed below, Congress believed that taxpayers above the phase-
out range for IRA contributions· would be making the expenditure 
in question, i.e., would be making additions to savings, regardless 
of whether the IRA deductions were available.18 Thus, Congress 
viewed its legislation as reversing an otherwise available deduction 
rather than barring the making of an expenditure. Accordingly, it 
is appropriate to consider the phase-out of the IRA deduction and 
of certain real estate loss deductions as increasing the effective 
marginal rate of tax imposed upon taxpayers having such expenses. 
II. EVALUATING THE 1986 PHASE-OUTS 
A. The Scope of the Problem 
The phasing-out of a tax allowance effectively increases the mar-
ginal tax rate applicable only to those taxpayers whose configura-
tion of income falls within the range over which the allowance is 
phased out. Once the allowance is fully phased out for a taxpayer 
(typically because the taxpayer's income exceeds the phase-out 
range)/9 the disallowance has no further effect upon the taxpayer's 
marginal tax rate. Indeed, the central impropriety of phasing out 
tax allowances is that it results in a decline in the effective margi-
nal tax rate as income increases. 
· Accordingly, the extent of the adverse effect of phasing out tax 
allowances upon the rationality of the Code is a function of the 
number of taxpayers affected by the phase-outs and the extent to 
which the effective marginal rates of tax facing those taxpayers are 
increased by the phasing out of allowances. Lest the 1986 legisla-
tion be viewed as an innocuous extension of prior law, the overall 
effect of the pre-1986 phase-outs should be contrasted with the 
present state of the law. 
1. Prior Law 
Phasing out a tax allowance is an exercise in targeting tax bene-
18 H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., let Sess. 683 (1985) [hereinafter House Report]. 
10 For phase-outs in the nature of deduction floors, the complete disallowance of the de-
ductions is a function of both the level of income and the amount of the otherwise deducti-
ble expenditures. 
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fits or burdens. Prior to the 1986 Act, Congress used disappearing 
allowances to administer a form of welfare through the taxing sys-
tem for very low income families with dependent children. This 
program entitled families with dependents to a small refundable 
"earned income" tax credit, the amount of which declined as in-
come exceeded $6,500 and disappeared altogether when family in-
come exceeded $11,000.2° For 1986, the personal exemption was 
$1,080 which, for a family of three, exempted $3,240 of income 
from tax. With the zero bracket amount for that year established 
at $3,670 on a joint return, such a family would become taxable 
only on income in excess of $6,910 although the credit itself would 
completely eliminate tax until adjusted gross income exceeded 
$8,930.21 As a result, the phase-out of this $550 credit only affected 
the marginal tax rate of the very narrow slice of taxpayers whose 
income fell in the range of about $9,000 to $11,000. 
Further, an additional credit equal to 10 percent of the cost of 
child care was extended to families with income below $10,000.22 
At that level of income, 30 percent, rather than the normal 20 per-
cent, of child care expenditures could be credited against the in-
come tax. However, the additional credit was gradually eliminated 
at higher income levels and was completely phased out when fam-
ily income reached $30,000.28 While the phase-out of this credit af-
fected a far broader range of taxpayers, the effect of the phase-out 
upon their marginal brackets was obscured by the manner in which 
the additional credit was phased out. Unlike other phase-outs of 
tax allowances, this credit is phased out as income rises in $2,000 
steps. One percentage point of the additional credit is lost as ad-
justed gross income passes each $2,000 step above $10,000.24 As a 
result, earning the single dollar of income that causes adjusted 
gross income to increase from, say, $12,000 to $12,001 precipitates 
the loss of one percentage point of the credit. 
Since the maximum amount of expenditures for which a credit 
•• Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 32. 
•• On the facts stated in the text, the tax on that adjusted income prior to the earned 
income credit would be $253.80 under§ 1(a)(3) of the 1954 Code; the available credit would 
be $253 ($550 - 0.122($8,930 - $6,500)). See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 32(b). 
•• See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 21. 
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 21(a)(2). 
•• Id. 
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could be taken is limited to $4,800,211 the loss of that one percent-
age point of the credit could result in an increase in tax liability of 
up to $48. Thus the effective rate of tax on that additional one 
dollar of income would be 4800 percent, while in a very real sense 
the marginal rate of tax applicable to the next $1,999 of income 
would remain the nominal marginal rate. Having passed to the 
higher income step, additional income would not result in any fur-
ther loss of the tax allowance. It might, of course, be more realistic 
to view the additional tax of $48 as attributable to the entire 
amount by which the taxpayer's income exceeded the lower step. 
So viewed, however, the effect of withdrawing this tax allowance is 
to increase the marginal rate of tax by a highly variable and seem-
ingly random amount. As income rises, the increase in the effective 
rate of tax is reduced. Thus if adjusted gross income exceeds the 
lower step by just $100, the effective marginal rate of tax on that 
income would be increased by 48 percent rather than 4800 percent. 
But, if the excess were $1,000, the increase in the rate would be 
only 4.8 percent. Amortizing the tax increase over the entire step 
produces an increase in the effective rate of tax on a taxpayer enti-
tled to the maximum credit of 2.4 percent-an amount that may 
be said to represent the average increase in rate over the entire 
$10,000 range of income over which this allowance is withdrawn. 
For the further analytical purposes of this paper, the effect of this 
phase-out will be so described. Nevertheless, the real effect of 
phasing out the child care credit is far less rational and does not so 
directly translate into an increase in the effective rate of tax as do 
other phase-outs. 26 
Finally, under prior law, the personal deductions for medical ex-
penses and casualty losses were both subject to floors that were 
defined in terms of adjusted gross income. Thus, medical expenses 
were not deductible except to the extent they exceeded 5 percent 
of adjusted gross income27 and casualty losses were subject to a 
•• See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 21(c)(2). 
•• Section 22 of the 1954 Code also provided a credit that was phased out as income rose. 
For taxpayers over 65 years of age or totally disabled, the section provided a maximum 
credit of $1,125 that was phased out, on a joint return, over an income range of $10,000 to 
$25,000. That credit was not altered by the 1986 legislation. See I.R.C. § 22. Because of the 
limited application of this credit, its effect is not considered in the text. Nevertheless, the 
§ 22 credit creates an additional "hump" in the rate schedule. 
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 213(a). 
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similar floor of 10 percent.28 As considered above, the effect of 
these floors is to phase out tax allowances for taxpayers who have 
deductions in excess of those floors and who are entitled to itemize 
their deductions. As the income of such a taxpayer rises, his ability 
to deduct medical expenses or casualty losses is reduced. Since the 
increase in the effective rate of tax produced by this form of 
phase-out is equal to the floor percentage, these provisions could 
result in a 5, 10 or, in combination, 15 percent increase in the ef-
fective marginal rate of tax. Thus, a taxpayer facing a nominal rate 
of 40 percent would in fact be subject to a rate ranging from 42 to 
46 percent. 
While the effect of these phase-outs, therefore, could be substan-
tial, relatively few taxpayers were so dramatically affected by these 
provisions. The relatively high standard deduction (or its tempo-
rary equivalent, the zero bracket amount) limited the ability to 
itemize deductions to just under 40 percent of those filing returns 
for 1984.29 Of those itemizers, scarcely more than one-quarter were 
able to claim medical expense deductions in excess of the 5 percent 
floor. 30 Moreover, and not too surprisingly, roughly 58 percent of 
the itemizers claiming medical expense deductions had adjusted 
gross incomes below $25,000,31 and thus would not have been sub-
ject to a nominal rate of tax in excess of 18 percent under section 
1(a).32 Since a 5 percent increase in an 18 percent marginal rate 
would only increase the effective marginal tax rate by less than one 
percentage point, the effect of phasing out personal deductions 
under prior law was rarely substantial even for the relatively few 
taxpayers subject to these phase-outs. 
2. Current Law 
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the earned income 
credit has been retained33 although the number of taxpayers af-
fected by its phase-out has been greatly expanded. While the old 
credit was phased out between adjusted gross incomes of $6,500 
•• Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 165(h)(2). 
•• See Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Individual Income Tax 
Returns 1984, at 13 (1986). · 
•• I d. at 57-58. 
11 Id. at 58. 
•• See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 1(a). 
•• See I.R.C. § 32. 
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and $11,00084 and generally only affected the marginal tax rate of 
families earning over $9,000,811 the present credit is phased out over 
an adjusted gross income range of from $9,000 to $17,000.36 As a 
result, the number of taxpayers whose effective marginal tax rates 
will be increased by the phase-out of the earned income credit has 
been increased quite substantially. For 1984, the most recent year 
for which data is available, about 48 percent of all taxable returns 
showed an adjusted gross income of below $17,000.37 
On the other hand, the 1986 legislation made no change at all in 
the phase-out of the child care credit. 38 Thus, over a range of gross 
income extending from $10,000 to $30,000, the phase-out of this 
credit continues to produce an increase in the effective marginal 
rate of tax of at least 2.4 percent for a taxpayer claiming the maxi-
mum creditable amount. 38 
The floors on the deduction of medical expenses and casualty 
losses remain related to adjusted gross income, but the former has 
been increased from 5 percent to 7.5 percent of adjusted gross in-
come. 40 In addition, a similarly defined 2 percent floor has been 
inserted under the deduction for a wide range of miscellaneous ex-
penses including employee business expenses and expenses relating 
to investment activities.41 The increase in the floor on medical ex-
pense deductions will reduce the number of taxpayers at all in-
come levels who will be able to deduct any medical expenses, and 
thus will reduce the number of taxpayers who fall within the range 
of the phase-out of this deduction. On the other hand, for the rela-
tively few taxpayers who will see their deductions phased out with 
rising income, the increase in their effective marginal tax rates will 
be a substantial 7.5 percent. 
The introduction of the 2 percent floor on investment and em-
ployee business expenses can be expected to affect a far greater 
range of taxpayers, perhaps nearly all itemizers. However, the re-
14 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 32(b) . 
.. See supra sentence in text following note 21. 
18 See I.R.C. § 32(b). The $17,000 figure is reached by applying the formula in § 32(b), 
under which the credit is $800- 0.10(AGI- $9,000) for taxable years beginning after 1987. 
17 Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Individual Income Tax Re-
turns 1984, at 10 (1986) . 
.. See I.R.C. § 21. 
•• See supra full paragraph in text accompanying note 25. 
•• I.R.C. § 213(a). 
•• See I.R.C. § 67. 
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suiting increase in their marginal rates of tax will be correspond-
ingly less. 
In addition to these extensions of prior law, the 1986 legislation 
introduced the phase-out of the 15 percent bracket and the per-
sonal exemptions,"2 a phase-out of the ability to deduct contribu-
tions to IRAs,43 and a phase-out of the ability to claim net losses 
attributable to certain passive business activities."" If the taxpayer 
is unfortunate enough to become subject to the alternative mini-
mum tax, the amount exempted from that tax, $40,000 on a joint 
return, is phased out as alternative minimum taxable income ex-
ceeds $150,000."11 
Tracing the impact of these phase-outs on a typical taxpayer 
must of necessity be highly imprecise. Some phase-outs are related 
to taxable income while others are tied to adjusted gross income. 
Moreover, many of the phase-outs are only applicable to taxpayers 
who incurred certain categories of expenditures. Given those diffi-
culties, it is nevertheless highly enlightening to attempt to recon-
struct the actual marginal tax rates facing taxpayers at different 
income levels. The following illustration assumes that the taxpayer 
is married, files a joint return, has one dependent child, and other-
wise meets the requirements for obtaining the tax allowance in 
question. Moreover, the computations assume that the 1986 legis-
lation has been phased in fully. That is, it is assumed that the 
nominal tax brackets are 15 percent and 28 percent,"6 that the 
standard deduction on a joint return is $5,000,"7 and that each per-
•• See I.R.C. § l(g). 
41 See I.R.C. § 219(g). 
44 See I.R.C. § 469(i)(3). While not so directly affecting individuals, current law continues 
the phase-out of the graduated rates applicable to corporations. Under prior law, the phase-
out commenced at a taxable income of $1 million. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § ll(b). At 
present, the phase-out begins at $100,000 and results in an increase in the effective marginal 
rate of tax from the nominal 34% to 39%. See I.R.C. § ll(b). Thus, for the many small 
corporations with taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000 (the figure qt which the 
maximum increase in tax due to the 5% surtax, $11,750, is reached), the nominal corporate 
rate is as illusory as are the nominal rates applicable to individuals. 
•• See I.R.C. § 55(d)(3). This phase-out has the effect of increasing the nominal alterna-
tive minimum tax rate by 25% from 21% (for individuals) to 26.25%. One of the defects in 
the alternative tax approach is that it causes taxpayers to shift between different rate 
schedules. This temporary increase in the alternative tax rate simply aggravates that 
problem. 
•• I.R.C. § l(a). 
47 I.R.C. § 63(c). 
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sonal exemption is $2,000.48 
Under those assumptions, of course, the taxpayer would not 
have any taxable income until his adjusted gross income exceeded 
$11,000. Assuming, as would be typical at that income level, that 
the entire amount of the taxpayer's income was earned income, the 
taxpayer would be entitled to an earned income credit although 
the amount of that credit was in the process of being phased out. 
At an adjusted gross income of $13,400, the taxpayer's tax liability, 
aside from the earned income credit, would equal $360 and he 
would be entitled to an earned income credit of precisely the same 
amount. 49 An additional dollar of income will be subject to tax, but 
not merely at the nominal 15 percent rate. That additional dollar 
would also produce a loss of 10 cents of the amount of the earned 
income credit,110 thereby subjecting the taxpayer to a tax not of 15 
cents but of 25 cents on his first taxable dollar. That 25 percent 
effective marginal tax rate will persist until the taxpayer's adjusted 
gross income reaches $17,000,111 at which point the earned income 
credit is entirely eliminated-unless the taxpayer is entitled to a 
child care credit. 
A taxpayer with a single child is entitled to a child care credit on 
a maximum of $2,400 of child care expenditures at a rate that de-
clines once adjusted gross income exceeds $10,000.112 That addi-
tional credit will shelter the taxpayer from tax until his adjusted 
gross income approximates $16,000.113 At that point, the taxpayer is 
not only subject to an effective marginal rate of 25 percent attribu-
table to the disappearance of the earned income credit, but is also 
subject to the rate increase produced by the loss of the child care 
credit. Allocating the increased tax liability produced from passing 
from one $2,000 step to another produces an increase in the margi-
nal rate of 1.2 percentage points. Thus, such a taxpayer will be 
subject to a 26.2 percent marginal rate. Moreover, if the taxpayer 
•• I.R.C. § 151(d). 
•• When AGI is $13,400 the credit equals $800 - 0.10($13,400 - $9,000), or $360. See 
I.R.C. § 32(b). 
00 See id. 
•• Since the credit is $800 - O.lO(AGI - $9,000), there is no credit left when AGI 
reaches $17,000. See id. 
•• See I.R.C. § 21. 
•• At $16,000, the maximum child care credit is $648. See I.R.C § 21(a). The tax liability 
of the hypothetical family is $750. See I.R.C. § 1(a). This amount is reduced by the $648 
credit and the earned income credit, which is $800 - 0.10($16,000 - $9,000), or $100. 
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has either medical expenses or employee business expenses in ex-
cess of the 7.5 percent or 2 percent floors, any increase in his ad-
justed gross income will cause a progressive loss of those deduc-
tions and an increase in his effective marginal rate of tax. While 
most taxpayers at this level of income will not have itemized de-
ductions in excess of the standard deduction (and thus will not be 
affected by the loss of these specific deductions), the unfortunate 
taxpayer who is entitled to itemize his deductions could find his 
effective marginal rate of tax increased by up to 9.5 percent. Such 
a taxpayer would be facing an effective marginal rate of tax of 28.7 
percent, an amount slightly in excess of the nominal rate of tax 
facing taxpayers at the highest income levels. 
When the earned income credit is fully phased out at an ad-
justed gross income of $17,000,M or a taxable income of about 
$6,000, the effective marginal rate of tax declines to the nominal 15 
percent bracket rate enhanced only by the effect of the loss of the 
child care credit and any itemized deductions to which the tax-
payer is entitled. The marginal rate will again decline, of course, at 
an adjusted gross income level of $30,000 for taxpayers who had 
been entitled to the extra 10 percent child care credit. At that level 
of income, the taxpayer's marginal rate will have finally declined to 
the nominal 15 percent bracket rate enhanced only by the possible 
loss of itemized deductions. A taxpayer who progressively loses his 
entitlement to those deductions will, of course, never be subject to 
a marginal tax rate as low as 15 percent. 
The nominal 28 percent rate becomes applicable when the tax-
payer's taxable income reaches $29,750.116 However, at approxi-
mately that income level, most taxpayers will begin to lose their 
ability to deduct contributions to an IRA. The progressive loss of 
the ability to deduct up to $4,000 to the IRAs of a working couple 
as adjusted- gross income rises from $40,000 to $50,00066 has the 
effect of increasing the marginal rate of tax by 40 percent. Such a 
taxpayer, therefore, may be viewed as not subject to a marginal 
rate of tax of 28 percent but rather of 39.2 percent. Moreover, such 
a taxpayer is quite likely to have itemized deductions in excess of 
the standard deduction and thus simultaneously to be losing an 
.. See I.R.C. § 32(b). 
•• See I.R.C.§ l(a). 
•• See I.R.C.§ 219. 
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ability to deduct employee business expenses and perhaps medical 
expenses. Thus, the actual effective marginal rate of tax facing the 
taxpayer is likely to be increased by at least 2 percent to an even 
40 percent, if not higher. 
Once the deduction for IRA contributions has been fully phased 
out and the floors on medical and business expenses have exceeded 
the taxpayer's expenditures so that no deductions may be claimed 
for such items, the taxpayer's marginal effective rate of tax will 
finally fall to the nominal 28 percent. At this point, where adjusted 
gross income has exceeded $50,000, a taxpayer may for the first 
time be subject to a marginal rate of tax that is equivalent to the 
bracket rate established by section 1. However, for the 90 percent 
or more of the taxpaying public whose incomes do not achieve this 
level, the nominal rate of tax prescribed by section 1 bears little if 
any relationship to their actual effective tax rate. 
On a joint return, the 28 percent effective tax rate persists until 
the taxpayer has taxable income of $71,900. At that point, of 
course, the 5 percent surcharge is first imposed and the effective 
tax rate increases to 33 percent. For some taxpayers, however, the 
increase in their effective tax rates does not come to an end. At 
taxable income levels ranging from approximately $80,000 to 
$120,000, the taxpayer will rapidly lose his ability to deduct losses 
attributable to rental real property under section 469(i). The rela-
tively rapid phase-out of that allowance results in a 50 percent in-
crease in the marginal rate of tax from 33 percent to 49.5 percent. 
Should such an unfortunate taxpayer still be entitled to claim 
medical and employee business expenses, that rate of tax could 
further be increased by up to 9.5 percent to 54.2 percent. 
Finally, having been stripped of the benefits of the earned in-
come credit, the extra child care credit, the IRA deductions, the 
benefit of the 15 percent bracket, the amount of his personal ex-
emptions and rental activity losses, the taxpayer's marginal effec-
tive rate of tax would decline to a permanent 28 percent. At that 
point, his marginal rate of tax will finally have returned to the 
marginal rate facing a taxpayer with adjusted gross income of 
$16,000. 
B. The Reasons for the Problem 
Even technically deficient provisions, such as the phasing out of 
tax allowances, may find a justification in other tax or social objec-
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tives. The enormous increase in the use of phased out tax al-
lowances in the 1986 legislation, however, was accompanied by a 
similar increase in the range of purposes for enacting such provi-
sions. Unfortunately, many of those purposes are far less compel-
ling than were the justifications for the far more modest phase-
outs enacted prior to 1986. 
The principal phase-outs of prior law, the earned income credit 
and the additional child care credit, were expressly designed to tar-
get economic assistance to workers at the very lowest edge of the 
income scale. Both provisions executed a negative income tax that 
constituted the functional equivalent of a federally funded welfare 
program. 
Whether it is reasonable and appropriate to target welfare assis-
tance through a system of disappearing credits may be debatable, 
since the effect of that approach is to substantially increase the 
effective marginal tax rate imposed upon the beneficiaries of this 
relief as they first become taxpayers. Nevertheless, for Congress to 
wish to limit this form of assistance to the very poorest segments 
of society in much the same fashion that eligibility for food stamps 
is limited was entirely rational. 
While the 1986 legislation continued, albeit in expanded form, 
the use of phase-outs to target federal assistance on low income 
taxpayers, the phase-outs introduced in 1986 were generally funda-
mentally different from their predecessors. While the continued ef-
fect of these new provisions is to grant tax allowances to lower in-
come taxpayers while denying those benefits to upper income 
taxpayers, the target of these new provisions is not the low income 
taxpayer but rather the high income taxpayer. Phase-outs that 
commence at adjusted gross income levels of $70,000 or $100,000 
can scarcely be viewed as low income relief. 
While the need to find revenue to offset the effect of the rate 
reductions can be said to underlie, and thus partially explain, most 
of the limitations on deductions contained in the 1986 legislation, 
the motivation for phasing out deductions of IRA's most nearly re-
sembles the purposes for the pre-1986 phase-outs. Congress viewed 
this deduction as a technique for stimulating savings and sup-
pressing consumption. Whether the deduction had that effect at 
any income level was a matter of some debate.117 Congress con-
07 See Galper & Byce, Individual Retirement Accounts: Facts and Issues, 31 Tax Notes 
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eluded, however, that the deduction had little, if any, effect upon 
taxpayers at moderate to high levels of income. Those taxpayers, it 
was believed, would save an amount equal to the maximum IRA 
deduction without the tax incentive and the deduction merely re-
duced the tax liability of high income taxpayers without increasing 
the amount saved.118 In part for these reasons, the Senate proposed 
the elimination of deductible IRA contributions for participants in 
qualified retirement plans.119 However, the deduction was popular 
and politically difficult to eliminate completely. As a result, the 
deduction was phased out for taxpayers having adjusted gross in-
comes in excess of $40,000. 
The phase-out of the IRA deduction may thus be seen as an at-
tempt to target tax relief at the lower end of the income 
scale-although not exactly upon low income taxpayers. As in the 
case of the similar phase-out of the child care credit, that congres-
sional objective is not inappropriate. As a result, this phase-out, 
which is technically the most defensible, may also be the most ra-
tionally motivated. 
On the other hand, the phase-outs of the effect of the 15 percent 
bracket and the personal exemptions were nothing more than 
thinly (if at all) disguised attempts to restore to the taxing system 
some of the progressivity that was eliminated in moving to a nomi-
nal maximum bracket of 28 percent. The complex political maneu-
vering that seemed necessary for the enactment of any legislation . 
required the appearance of a maximum bracket of about 28 per-
cent. On the other hand, revenue neutrality, both on an overall and 
income class basis,60 required that more tax be collected from the 
higher income taxpayers than a 28 percent bracket would provide. 
For that scarcely rational reason, the benefits of the 15 percent 
bracket, the personal exemptions and the exemption from the pas-
sive loss limitation were phased out.61 Put harshly, but not entirely 
inaccurately, the purpose that underlies these phase-outs was po-
litical deceit. 
The reason for phasing out the deductions for employee business 
917 (June 9, 1986); Summers, Letter, 31 Tax Notes 1014 (June 9, 1986). 
"" House Report, supra note 18, at 683. 
•• See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 543 (1986). 
80 See Steuerle, Lessons from the Tax Reform Process, 32 Tax Notes 145 (1986). 
81 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Interview with Chief Counsel John Colvin, 33 Tax Notes 
792, 794 (Dec. 1, 1986). 
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expenses and investment expenses through the adoption of a 2 per-
cent floor is not entirely clear. The announced reasons for this pro-
vision were simplification and administrative convenience,62 but 
the case for those benefits is weak indeed. Those results can only 
be achieved for the relatively few taxpayers who can itemize their 
deductions (less than one-third of all taxpayers) and who in addi-
tion will not have miscellaneous deductions in excess of the 2 per-
cent floor. Moreover, even those benefits must be offset by the 
complexity and manipulation created by plans to avoid the new 
floor. 63 While this is not the forum in which to debate the merits of 
this new floor on deductions, it is clear that the justification for 
such a provision is dubious. Accordingly, the adverse effect of this 
provision on marginal rates becomes harder to justify. 
Moreover, it is not irrelevant that the 2 percent floor on income-
related deductions is the third "personal" deduction that is phased 
out by an income-related floor. While the modest effect on margi-
nal rates created by the older 5 percent floor on medical expenses 
may have been too small to be of concern, it does not follow that 
the existing 2, 7.5, and 10 percent floors on business, medical and 
casualty loss deductions are similarly inconsequential. Rather, it is 
the congressional tendency, illustrated by the 1986 legislation, to 
expand the use of phase-outs that has produced a cumulative ef-
fect on marginal rates that may not be acceptable. 
C. The Effect of Phase-Outs on the Taxing System 
The argument made here has been that tax allowances, once 
granted at lower levels of income, cannot be "phased out." At the 
very most, Congress may impose a tax at a given level of income 
that is sufficient to restore the tax savings generated by a tax al-
lowance. The significance of this point is that, as a result, the nu-
merous provisions of current law that purport to phase out tax al-
•• See House Report, supra note 18, at 109-10. 
•• Section 67, for instance, applies the 2% floor on miscellaneous business deductions to 
individuals. See I.R.C. § 67(a). Thus, employee expenses that are reimbursed by the em-
ployer are not subject to the 2% floor, nor, of course, are expenses of the employer that 
incidentally benefit the employee. Tax planning now requires shifting employee business 
expenses to employers in one way or another. Some plans will be less successful than others, 
which will precipitate audits, litigation, and perhaps even further legislation. See Diss & 
Ruby, Miscellaneous Itemized Deduction Floor Is Bad Policy, 34 Tax Notes 689 (February 
16, 1987). 
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lowances cannot be evaluated in terms of the rationality of denying 
certain deductions, credits or rate relief to high income taxpayers. 
The effect of a phase-out is not to withdraw the benefits of the 
allowance, but rather, is to impose an effective marginal rate of tax 
that is higher than the nominal rate on a limited segment of in-
come. The propriety of the phase-out, therefore, must be appraised 
in those terms. 
1. Vertical Equity 
Phase-outs, designed to recapture the amount of tax savings pro-
duced by a tax allowance, such as the phase-out of the effects of 
the 15 percent bracket, result in an increase in the marginal tax 
rate that is only temporary. Once the tax savings in question has 
been fully recaptured, the "second" tax ceases and the effective 
marginal rate returns to its nominal level. Thus, the propriety of 
these provisions must be evaluated in terms of the real net effect 
of the provisions upon taxpayers: the imposition of a third margi-
nal rate upon a limited segment of income so that over some 
ranges of income, marginal rates actually decline as income rises. 
The 5 percent surtax, for example, can be justified only if it is rea-
sonable and appropriate for Congress to impose a higher marginal 
tax rate on the last dollars earned by a moderately wealthy tax-
payer than upon the last dollars earned by a very wealthy 
taxpayer. 
If the purported phase-outs of these tax allowances are viewed 
properly, there is little that can or need be said concerning the 
propriety of the effect of these phase-outs upon the vertical equity 
of the new Code. While the case for progressivity may indeed be 
"uneasy,"64 the case for regressivity is untenable-should anyone 
wish to make it. The reduction of the marginal tax rate on very 
high income taxpayers (especially those with few children!) quite 
simply was immoral and is unacceptable. That limitation on the 33 
percent bracket should be repealed immediately. 
While continued essentially unchanged from prior law, the 
phase-outs that affect taxpayers at the very bottom of the income 
scale are particularly inappropriate. To require families earning in 
the neighborhood of $15,000 to pay 25 percent, or more, of their 
84 See W. Blum & H. Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1953). 
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increased earnings in federal income taxes (aside from social secur-
ity withholding) when families earning twice as much are subject 
to a marginal rate of tax scarcely more than one-half that level is 
essentially unjust. That consequence of the phase-out of the 
earned income and child care credits may have escaped criticism 
under prior law because of the relatively few taxpayers who exper-
ienced an increase in their marginal bracket rates by virtue of 
these provisions. However, by vastly increasing the number of low 
income taxpayers affected by these phase-outs, Congress greatly 
multiplied the number of taxpayers who are treated unfairly, and 
thus, rendered these low income phase-outs both more visible and 
less acceptable. That consequence of the 1986 legislation is un-
likely to pass without notice and will do little to restore the ebbing 
respect for the taxing system. 
Sophisticated tax writers may view the phase-out of the earned 
income and additional child care credits as extraneous to the tax-
ing system and thus of no consequence to the rate structure. Both 
credits are a form of negative tax or subsidy to low income wage 
earners, and it is not unreasonable to diminish the amount of these 
subsidies as earnings increase. Nevertheless, for whatever reason, 
Congress chose to implement this subsidy through the taxing sys-
tem, and the phasing out of these allowances is in fact accom-
plished by temporarily increasing the tax rate payable by low in-
come taxpayers. Having adopted the taxing system as the 
mechanism for implementing these subsidies, it cannot now be 
contended that the taxing system is not affected by the form of the 
subsidy.66 
2. Horizontal Equity 
The essential unfairness of the phasing out of tax allowances is 
not limited, however, to the resulting regression in marginal rates 
that occurs at various ranges of income. Taxpayers whose level of 
income places them beyond the range over which a tax allowance is 
phased out are not subject to the increase in marginal rates that 
the phase-out produces. However, if these taxpayers incur the ex-
pense for which the tax allowance has been withdrawn, they are 
•• See generally Steuerle & Wilson, The Taxation of Poor and Lower Income Workers, 34 
Tax Notes 695 (February 16, 1987). 
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nevertheless adversely affected by the phase-out because they are 
denied a deduction. If that deduction, in the context of the taxing 
system as a whole, is necessary to the proper definition of their 
taxable income, the horizontal equity of the Code will have been 
diminished. 
The attempted phase-out of the personal exemptions is illustra-
tive. For a taxpayer subject to this extension of the surtax, the tax 
produced must be evaluated in terms of the rationality of the im-
position of a tax on an amount of income measured by the number 
of dependents claimed by the taxpayer. So evaluated, the surtax is 
indefensible. For a taxpayer whose income is high enough that he 
is not entitled to any deduction for personal exemptions, the effect 
of the surtax is identical to the denial of the ability to claim deduc-
tions with respect to dependents-precisely the result intended by 
Congress in phasing out these deductions. That result, however, is 
equally unfair. 
The fundamental notion that supports not taxing the first few 
dollars earned by a taxpayer is that each individual should be enti-
tled to provide for his own and his family's basic essentials before 
being asked to contribute to the maintenance of government. Ac-
cordingly, some income, which represents the basic consumption 
needs of each individual, has traditionally been exempted from 
tax. This concept of fairness has caused the taxing system to dis-
criminate among taxpayers on the basis of the number of the tax-
payer's personal exemptions in determining his tax-paying capac-
ity. If that discrimination is appropriate among individuals of 
modest wealth, it remains appropriate for individuals of great 
wealth. 
The observation that individuals of great wealth are able to sup-
port their dependents without the assistance of the personal ex-
emption is not responsive to this criticism. Such an argument, 
which would support the elimination of all deductions for high in-
come taxpayers, misses the point of the initial grant of a deduc-
tion. Maintenance of fairness within the taxing system requires 
that taxpayers in unequal tax-paying circumstances be treated un-
equally but in proportion to their tax-paying capacity. The per-
sonal exemption is just as necessary to discrimination among high 
income taxpayers as it is to discrimination among low income tax-
payers. The failure to discriminate results in an unfair allocation of 
the taxation burden. 
1987] "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances 531 
Aside from the phase-out of the 15 percent bracket, the burden 
of the increase in marginal tax rates is not distributed among tax-
payers in any uniform or defensible manner. Rather, the burden of 
these additional taxes is borne by randomly selected groups of tax-
payers who either have dependent children, make contributions to 
retirement accounts, invest in real estate, or engage in any of the 
other discrete activities that generate deductions that are phased 
out. That distribution of the incidence of the surtaxes has dis-
rupted the horizontal equity of the Code. 
3. Efficiency Considerations 
The propriety and significance of increasing the effective margi-
nal tax rates payable by middle and upper income taxpayers is in 
part a function of the reasons underlying the adoption of the nomi-
nal 28 percent rate. No single reason can be ascribed for the rela-
tively abrupt transition from a progressive rate schedule attaining 
rather high levels to a relatively flat schedule containing far more 
modest rates. Many were attracted to the simple, but unachieved, 
notion of a reduction in the burden of the income tax. Others envi-
sioned massive simplification, which was also unachieved, flowing 
from a flatter rate schedule, and anticipated that a low, flat rate 
would eliminate much of the incentive to engage in tax sheltering 
or tax evasion activities. Still others believed that lower income tax 
rates would stimulate productivity and capital formation. Some, 
perhaps, simply viewed progression as unfair. 
Regardless of which of these reasons, or others, one adopts for 
the 1986 legislation, the ad hoc and partially concealed increases in 
marginal rates produced by the phase-out of tax allowances are as 
inconsistent with those objectives as explicit creation of a third or 
fourth bracket. It is unlikely that taxpayers who are sufficiently 
tax-conscious and sophisticated to engage in complex tax reduction 
pursuits will be fooled by the structure of the 1986 legislation into 
believing that they are only subject to a marginal tax rate of 28 
percent. To the contrary, taxpayers forced into effective marginal 
rates of 40 and 50 percent by the phasing out of various tax al-
lowances can be anticipated to respond to those rates in exactly 
the same manner as they would respond to a more straightforward 
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approach to progression.86 As to those taxpayers, the phase-outs 
affecting moderate and high income taxpayers are plainly inconsis-
tent with all of the varied purposes that underlie the enactment of 
the current nominal rate structure. 
Even if disguised increases in the marginal tax rate produce a 
smaller aggregate loss in efficiency because less than all taxpayers 
are affected by the rate increases, this minor success must be bal-
anced against the equity losses that this technique creates. On that 
subjective issue, opinions can be expected to vary. However, after 
weighing the evident unfairness imposed upon the large number of 
taxpayers whose marginal rates are inflated by the proliferation of 
phase-outs against the speculative efficiency gains of the 1986 leg-
islation, most observers should agree that the taxing system has 
not been improved by the adoption of the artifice of the disappear-
ing deduction. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
The adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 was a grand 
exercise in compromise and political expediency. Much that re-
sulted may evolve into a major and permanent improvement in the 
taxing system. Much more, unfortunately, corrupted the fairness 
and principled rationality of the law. The phasing out of tax al-
lowances was immediately perceived as unfair and has detracted 
from the popular acceptance of Congress' efforts.87 This article ar-
gues here that these provisions are not only unfair but also techni-
cally unsound. The phasing out of tax allowances is an inappropri-
ate technique that should be eliminated from the Code. 
00 See Hevener, The Hidden Fifty Percent Marginal Rates of H.R. 3838, 31 Tax Notes 
1341 (June 30, 1986). 
01 See id. 
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